Woku detects and blocks brute force attacks against login to
protect user accounts.
How it works
- Every login attempt (successful or failed) is recorded in a
LoginAttempt table with the identifier used (lowercased), the
source IP, and the result.
- If an account accumulates 5 failed attempts in the last 15
minutes, the system:
- Sets the user’s
lockedUntil field to 15 minutes in the
future.
- Records an
auth.lockout entry in the audit
log with failedAttempts,
lockedUntil, and the IP of the last attempt.
- Sends an email to the user notifying them of the lockout (see
below).
- During the lockout, any login attempt (even with the correct
password) responds with
403 Forbidden.
- Once the 15-minute window passes, the lockout is lifted
automatically on the next attempt, no manual action is
required.
Notification email
When the lockout is triggered, the system sends the user an email
through AWS SES with:
- Subject: “Temporary lock on your woku account”.
- Body: explains that we detected several failed attempts,
when the lockout is lifted, from which IP, and a CTA to reset
the password.
The email is fire-and-forget: if SES is down, the lockout still
happens and the email failure is logged internally; there is no impact
on security.
Administrative unlock
If the user needs to log in before the window passes, an
internal administrator can unlock them from the backoffice. The
action is recorded as auth.unlock in the audit log with the IP of
the request.
Limitations
- Detection is per-user, not per-IP. A distributed attacker
probing many different users from multiple IPs does not trigger
the per-user lockout, but is still exposed to the global rate
limit (10 req/s, 50 req/10s, 100 req/min per IP, managed
by
@nestjs/throttler).
- If the attacker uses an identifier that does not match any
user, there is no lockout (there is nothing to lock), but the rate
limit per IP still applies.
Status check
A user’s lockout status is not exposed publicly to the
front end. The UI shows the same generic message (“Incorrect
username or password”) to avoid revealing whether an account
exists, this reduces the risk of user enumeration. Última modificación el 15 de septiembre de 2026